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• 1 2023-05-27T16:02:10-04:00 Collectivization and "dekulakization" 16 plain 2023-05-29T22:29:08-04:00 The forceful introduction of agricultural collectivization and "dekulakization" in the late 1920s and first years of the 1930s was a direct causal precursor of the Holodomor.
  
  The goal of collectivization was to consolidate individually-owned land and individual or family labor into a single farm collectively owned and operated by a village that was called a kolkhoz (Russian) or kolhosp (Ukrainian). This was consistent with the Bolshevik approach to private property, and was seen as promoting the elimination of "enemies of the working class".
  
  Despite an intense campaign, early efforts at voluntary collectivization were not embraced by village farmers in Ukraine: as of early 1929, less than 4% of arable land in Ukraine was collectivized. In fact, the idea of the collective farm was seen by many rural Ukrainians as a new form of serfdom.
  
  In early 1929, methods changed from a voluntary to administrative enrollment, and in December 1929, a decree was issued on the collectivization of livestock within a 3-month period, which drove many peasants to slaughter their animals. Coercive measures such as the expropriation of property and deportation of private "wealthy" landowners known as kulaks (Russian) or kurkuls (Ukrainian) were instituted.
  
  At first defined to be owners of more than 8 acres of land, the term kulak/kurkul gradually became more and more vague, and eventually came to mean almost any land or livestock-owning peasants who might be antagonistic to or hesitant allies of the Bolsheviks. They were considered to be "class enemies" of poorer peasants, and had been described by Lenin as "bloodsuckers, vampires, plunderers of the people and profiteers". Despite this, Lenin did not pursue widespread suppression of the kulaks/kurkuls in favor of an approach that emphasized persuasion and willing participation.
  
  
  With Stalin's First Five Year Plan, an all-out effort to "liquidate kulaks as a class" was begun. This included execution or imprisonment; internal exile to Siberia, the North, the Urals, or Kazakhstan; and/or confiscation of property and eviction. The "dekulakization" process had major impacts on the Soviet Union in general, and in Ukraine in particular. It caused major economic disruptions as some of the most productive farmers were forcibly removed from their land, and it led to the deportation and death of millions of people.

  The coercive collectivization and dekulakization drives of late 1929 and early 1930 led to widespread resistance, particularly in Ukraine. This prompted Stalin, in his March 1930 article ‘Dizzy with Success’, to blame overzealous Bolshevik officials for the unrest. When the collectivization drive was briefly relaxed, farmers massively abandoned the kolhosps and took back their property. The collectivization drive, however, was again intensified later that year.

  Another factor that would lead to the Holodomor were the requisition quotas imposed by the central government in Moscow on the various grain-growing regions of the USSR. While those quotas were being raised generally, the demands on Ukraine were unusually high. This lead to the seizure of food products from both individual farmers and kolhosps in order to meet the procurement goals.
  
  This came to a head in 1931, when the requisition quota for Ukraine remained at the same level as 1930, despite the fact that agricultural yield was on track to be much lower. This was due to poor weather conditions, as well as the continually deteriorating conditions. Collectivized animals on the kolhosps were not being well cared for and/or were malnourished. This was due to a lack of interest by the collectivized farmers in caring for animals they no longer owned, as well as fodder shortages. Even worse, this happened just as procurement problems with tractors and other machinery made farm animals even more essential. The harvest in 1931 indeed fell precipitously. Collective farmers, who were in theory supposed to be paid in kind, were not receiving nearly the amount of food that they were entitled to. Many households simply did not have enough stores to survive the winter.
  
  Despite these ominous signs, the Kremlin sent Vyacheslav Molotov to pressure Ukrainian Bolshevik leaders to fulfill the now utterly unrealistic grain quota. To achieve this, seed stocks and fodder were seized, and grain that had been received by farmers as in kind payment was confiscated. This exploitation overtaxed the Ukrainian republic and set the stage for the famine that was to come.